The Survival of Customary Law in the Northern Mariana Islands
There are few American jurisdictions in which the traditional cultural practices celebrated by a minority of the population have the force of law, even when these practices are at times uncodified, imprecise, and disputed. In 1975, after three centuries of foreign rule, the people of the Northern Mariana Islands established such a jurisdiction-the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI"). This article surveys the customary law in place in the CNMI and considers the obstacles of applying this law in a society whose culture and customs are rapidly evolving.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Northern Mariana Islands was initially inhabited by the Chamorro people, who arrived some 3500 to 4000 years ago. 1 Spanish colonization, beginning in 1668 with the establishment of a Jesuit mission, led to a dramatic decline in the Chamorro population. 2 After a series of revolts, the Spanish government relocated the entire native population from the islands of Saipan and Rota in the Northern Marianas to the neighboring island of Guam. 3 Not until the late 19th century were the Chamorros allowed to return. The CNMI is generally subject to federal law and the U.S. Constitution, with the exception of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. In order to provide representation from each of the populated islands, the Covenant disregards the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee of "one person, one vote." 16 Equal protection is also limited by prohibitions on the alienation of land from people who are of not of Northern Marianas descent. 17 The application of the Sixth Amendment is limited by the Attorney General's ability to prosecute some offenses in the absence of a jury trial. 18 The local government also currently maintains independent control over immigration, customs, and taxation. This, however, may change with the passage of bills pending in the U.S. Congress that provide for a federal takeover of immigration.
19
The CNMI has a limited statutory code, which was not enacted until 1984. 20 The statutory code contains some specific provisions for applying traditional customary law, primarily with respect to inheritance matters and the distribution of land. 21 While most of the statutory code is now comprised of public and local laws enacted by the CNMI Legislature, 15 Covenant to Establish many provisions derive from pre-CNMI law. 22 Further, Trust Territory law may still apply in certain situations, such as in the probate of the estate of a decedent who died during the Trust Territory time. 23 To the extent that these laws are silent, courts apply uncodified customary law (based on evidence offered by litigants) or U.S. common law (depending on the area of law).
24
Given its youth, the jurisdiction has little of its own common law to apply.
Cases pertaining to Commonwealth law are brought in the CNMI Superior Court, a court of general jurisdiction with five divisions. 25 Appeals are directed toward the three-justice panel that constitutes the CNMI Supreme Court. 26 Appeals from this court to the U.S. Supreme Court are extremely rare.
27

II. APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
A. Land categorization under the CNMI Code
The categorization of land is important in determining which probate laws apply. Most of this law is codified in the CNMI Code. 22 See Covenant, supra note 15, at § 505; see also Most Carolinians in the Northern Marianas descend from Carolinians "who migrated ... from ... the Caroline chain." With them they brought and were able to maintain for a while "much of their old social organization, customs and language." Among these customs was "their traditional land tenure pattern." . . . Traditional Carolinian land tenure is matrilineal, and land descends by the minimeal [sic] lineage, i.e., mother to daughter. The land under this tenure system is collectively owned and controlled by females.
. . . Matrilineal land was held, pursuant to Carolinian land custom, collectively by the females and recorded in the name of the oldest female member of the maternal line, with the oldest holding title and acting more or less as a "trustee" for the rest of the lineage members.
31
Rangamar goes on to say that the system was somewhat distorted by the various systems for registration of family land under the successive German, Japanese, and Trust Territory administrations:
The German administration began a system of land registration, under which both maternal lineage lands held collectively by females and lands received by Carolinian males under a newly initiated homestead program were registered.
32
Carolinian males received title to homestead land, which was recorded in their individual name. 32 The registration system did not usually record the names of the other female owners of the land. It was from this registration system that the term "customary trustee" evolved. Id. at 77 n.14.
. . . The Carolinian males that received property under the homestead program held the land individually. While some of these males gave their land to both female and male heirs, others chose to give the land only to their daughter(s) who then "subsequently founded a new matrilineal lineage." Hence, the applicability of Carolinian land custom to such lands became dependent upon the subsequent treatment of the land by the female recipient(s) of the land.
. . . The Japanese administration continued the German administration's system of registering both land held individually and matrilineal land. Under the American administration, however, Carolinian lands began to be registered in either the name of an individual Carolinian or in the name of the heirs of a decedent with a trustee designated, without regard to gender. For land held by an individual Carolinian, "[u]nless the family consents or agrees otherwise," the land becomes family land upon the individual's death and passes to the oldest surviving daughter as a customary trustee. 34 Any alienation of Carolinian family land, erection of a permanent structure on the land, or occupation of a permanent structure requires the consent of the family, which is determined by majority vote of the customary trustee and his siblings. 35 . As the number of inter-marriages increase between Northern Marianas persons (as defined in the CNMI Constitution) and non-Northern Marianas, the Article XII restriction will result in more conflicts with customary law on inheritance. 47 In Estate of Tudela, the CNMI Superior Court held that (1) section 2411 of the CNMI code (providing for a "person not of Northern Marianas descent" can receive by devise or descent "the maximum allowable legal interest in … real property" with any remaining interest passing to the next closest heirs or devisees eligible to own land in the CNMI) was an improper legislative attempt to transform an unconstitutional acquisition of a long-term interest in land by a non-NMI descent person; (2) the application of section 2601 (giving a surviving spouse has rights to exempt property of the decedent's estate) to non-NMI surviving spouses unconstitutional, as it would improperly allow the transfer of a family home to a person of non-NMI descent, in violation of Article XII (where there are children of the decedent); and (3) section 2902 is unconstitutional in its application to a non-NMI spouse, as it allows the spouse of a decedent to obtain a life estate in ancestral land with the children taking a vested remainder in fee simple, contrary to Article XII. 
B. Discerning the law of intestate succession
At the turn of the 21st century, very few of the probate cases handled by the Superior Court concern testate successions. It is not uncommon for an intestate succession to take place decades after the decedent's death. 48 Sometimes the only impetus for probating an estate is the government's exercise of eminent domain and the resulting need to determine which heirs should be awarded the proceeds of the forced sale. 49 In these delayed probate cases, the estate's only asset is land or proceeds from the sale of land. Integral in family agreements on intestate succession is the role of the customary trustee and possibly that of a figure described in some cases as the telap (chief). In Estate of Isaac
Kaipat, an expert witness on Carolinian culture testified that, while the oldest female acts as a trustee for the family property, it is the oldest son of the oldest female who acts as the telap and spokesperson for the family. 60 Carolinian culture requires the telap to work with the trustee and other heirs in making decisions. 61 In Estate of Remedio Malite, however, a different expert witness referred to the female trustee of family land as the telap.
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The power of the statutory code is also limited by the idea that it can be disproved by custom. In Willbanks v. Stein, after deciding that Chamorro custom applied, the Superior Court described a particular statute providing for inheritance of an illegitimate child 63 as the "best evidence of applicable Chamorro custom." 64 The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, holding that this section of the CNMI Code sets forth a standard of proof rather than evidence of custom. 65 The Supreme Court stated, "[w]hile the probate code may reflect certain aspects of custom, it does not, standing alone, establish custom as a matter of law." 66 The Supreme Court instructed the trial court to take further evidence, if warranted, on the issue of custom. 67 Thus, the CNMI Code often serves as the baseline for determining intestate succession, rather than a set of bright-line rules. Where the rules are altered, courts must go through the difficult process of determining who is the customary trustee (under Carolinian custom), who said what (often many years ago), which expert has the best knowledge of customary law, and whether the family has actually followed customary law.
C. Conflicting laws and customs regarding marital property
The wife when the husband died. 84 The court concluded that not to do so would result in sex discrimination against the wife, in violation of the CNMI Constitution.
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The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, finding that when the husband died, his property did not vest in his wife; it vested in his children (including illegitimate children not born to his wife). 86 The court drew from Palacios v. Coleman, 87 which held that when the property descends to the children, there is a corresponding custom which requires the children to support their widowed mother during her lifetime. 88 The court found that the wife benefitted from the Chamorro custom in which her children provided for her needs for the remainder of her life.
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These cases suggest two competing versions of Chamorro customary law-one version allows a husband to take all of the wife's land, while patte pareho 90 provides for community
property. Added to the confusion is the relevance of the CNMI's equal protection clause, which was relevant to the Ada Supreme Court and the Aldan Superior Court, but not to the Aldan Supreme Court and the Ada Superior Court. Thus, although the Marital Property Act appears to establish a community property regime, there are no clear rules to apply to many estates which remain to be probated.
As of this writing, the Superior Court is currently considering another variant on Chamorro customary law with respect to rights accruing from marriage: gumagachong, the Chamorro customary equivalent of common law marriage. The court must decide whether 84 Id. 85 Id. custom requires that the family members of a deceased gumagachong partner provide some share of the estate to the surviving partner. 91 As the Marital Property Act neither recognizes nor prohibits gumagachong, 92 the outcome of this case may result in another example of "judicial codification" of customary law that will impact future rights.
D. The uncertain effect of customary adoption on inheritance
Intestate succession treats illegitimate children and "adopted" children as legitimate, natural children. 93 The question of what constitutes "adoption" frequently arises in cases attempting to determine adoption for purposes of inheritance. Both the Carolinians and the Chamorros practice a form of customary adoption that may or may not grant full inheritance rights.
Carolinian customary law
The Carolinian practice of mwei-mwei is typically viewed as a valid adoption for inheritance purposes, 94 although a Carolinian family can agree to treat an adopted child as not belonging to the family for purposes of family land rights and intestate succession.
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Mwei-mwei occurs when a single adult or a married couple chooses to raise a child as if it were the natural child of the adopting party with the consent of the natural parent or parents. Code. 99 The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the concept of having to provide expert testimony to determine the cultural connotations of poksai.
100
The CNMI Supreme Court did not discuss situations in which families take in a child for a temporary period, after which the child returns to its original family. However, the term poksai also applies to this situation.
101
The the same case found that a child who had already inherited from his adopted parent was not entitled to inherit from his natural parent when the natural and adopted parents were brother and sister, because inheriting from both would amount to a double share in the family's assets. 106 As discussed infra, this decision did not result from the application of customary law, which proved inconclusive on this issue. Courts will likely confront this issue again, as there are many situations in which children are customarily adopted by close relatives (e.g., grandparents).
E.
Relaxations on the evidentiary and procedural rules frequent derivations from the American rules of evidence, the partida, is based on customary Chamorro law. A "partida" is a Chamorro custom that occurs when a father calls his family together and outlines the division of property among his children. 107 Courts consider partida on a case-by-case basis, because the means by which a partida is accomplished are flexible and the intent of the decedent must be effectuated where discerned. 108 Since the 1983 enactment of the Statute of Frauds, the partida is the only form of oral conveyance permitted in the CNMI. 109 Traditional oral wills may still be applicable for cases in which the decedent died prior to the enactment of the Statute of Frauds.
110
A testamento is a written memorialization of a partida that "preserves in writing the intent and directions of the male head of the family in regards to distribution of the family's property." 111 Depending upon the circumstances of the case, it may be the sole evidence of a conveyance. 112 The testamento need not meet the common law or CNMI Code evidentiary requirements for a will. 
124
The Superior Court struck these affidavits as being too conclusive and containing no factual support for the claim that the transfers were made by a partida, such as the time, place, or members present when the 'partida' was made."
125
The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, finding that when viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, the affidavits suggested that there was a partida. 126 The CNMI courts need not find that property title documents are conclusive, and may rely on testimony to controvert title. This is because of a presumption that any land in which title is vested in the female head of a Carolinian family is Carolinian family land belonging to the entire family rather than the title holder.
130
In Estate of Rita Kaipat, the Superior Court relied on a title document rather than Carolinian custom in determining that an heir of the decedent was the individual owner of the property. 131 On appeal, the CNMI Supreme Court held that failure to look behind the documents to determine how one heir acquired the land was an error. 132 The Superior Court was thus required to determine whether the individual heir held title for herself or on behalf of the clan. that the title determinations were "customary titles" rather than actual titles, such that the Superior Court "properly looked behind" the titles.
135
By contrast, in Estates of Antonio Teregeyo, the Superior Court rejected the argument that a title in a single person's name was a "customary title" for the benefit of the Carolinian family, because the title was in the name of a male instead of a family. 136 The court found this inconsistent with the Carolinian matrilineal tradition, and determined that the land in question belonging exclusively to the owner rather than to the family as Carolinian family land. 137 The CNMI Supreme Court upheld this finding.
138
Likewise, in Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, the CNMI Supreme Court found that the land at issue was not family land because it was deeded as a homestead. 139 Thus, all of the heirs, including the males, were entitled to an equal undivided interest. 
5.
Res judicata
Customary law has been used to soften the effect of res judicata and the doctrine of applying the law of the case. For example, in Estate of Rita Kaipat, litigants presented evidence of a 1991 evidentiary hearing in which a testifying witness failed to mention one Carmen Guelles as a child of the decedent when naming the decedent's children. 141 The same witness testified at a 2006 hearing that Carmen Guelles was an adopted child of the decedent. The above cases suggest that, although the CNMI evidence and civil procedure rules are almost carbon copies of the federal rules, they are applied so as to favor uncodified customary law.
F. Limitations on the jury trial-custom and culture in criminal law?
Customary law (or at least recognition of cultural morays) can also affect criminal law, in particular, the right to a trial by jury. 143 Id., slip op. at 7 (citing 8 N.M.I. Code § 2104(b)(4)). 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 Id. on the party relying on a custom as basis for her claim to convince the fact-finder that she (or the family) has actually practiced the custom at issue. 174 The court noted that without such evidence, the court would be applying the law of a particular custom where that custom might not exist. 175 In Diaz v. Taylor, the court was asked to restore the petitioner to the residence she claimed to be her family home. The residence had been transferred from the petitioner to a third party via a non-Chamorro method of conveyance. 176 Because the parties had already departed from
Chamorro custom, the court found that the petitioner could not rely on the custom that would have given her the right to remain in the residence until she died. 177 In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the court found that litigants (as well as the CNMI Supreme Court addressing an earlier issue in the case) had not followed the Carolinian culture as described by their own expert witnesses.
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Thus, the court decided to divide the disputed land equitably rather than by custom.
When courts do decide to rely on customary law, evidence of the law may be difficult to procure. In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the Superior Court qualified expert witnesses based solely on their purported knowledge of tradition relating to community involvement. 179 Witnesses offered conflicting testimony on the requisites to collect "double" inheritance from both the adopting and natural parents. The court concluded that witnesses appeared to be uncertain of what actually constituted the Carolinian culture, and that Northern Mariana Carolinians as a whole seemed to know little of the Carolinian culture as it existed in its original form in the Caroline Islands. 180 The 
D.
To what extent should customary law still be applied?
with indigenous control of the land." 184 Accordingly, the court rejected a claim that the U.S.
Constitution prevented the government of the Northern Mariana Islands from restricting land ownership to people of indigenous ancestry.
185
This argument is less compelling when the relative number of people actually practicing the culture has been dwindling dramatically for some time, when customary law becomes a trump card 186 in a dispute about rights to proceeds from land belonging to a distant ancestor, or when a culture is so far removed from its ancestral origins that no one really knows the customary law.
In attempting to discern the customary law, courts are left to sort out the truth from dubious expert testimonies and an extremely limited source of written anthropological evidence.
Even reliance on the latter is questionable. As much as Alexander Spoehr's treatise is considered the authority on Northern Marianas culture, it has been disregarded in litigation. For example, in
Estate of Aguida Amires, the CNMI Supreme Court noted, Spoehr is not accurate when he writes that "only babies may be adopted." 187 The court relied on testimony from Estate of Rofag to find that "[n]ormally, the child to be adopted is a baby, but there is evidence that a child who is nine, ten, or eleven years old could be customarily adopted, depending upon the circumstances." 188 Sorting out the traditional customs of the Northern Marianas is not likely to get an easier as the culture continues to change. As Professor Herald points out, economic development and changes toward higher standards of living inevitably result in cultural change. 189 The 2000 census showed that the CNMI is home to 44,400 immigrants out of a total population of 69,221. 190 According to a second quarter, 1999 census count, the largest ethnic group on Saipan was Filipino. 191 Since children born to these immigrants are automatically U.S. citizens, they may stay in the CNMI and leave a permanent impact on the culture.
192
A 1995 census found only 12,783 Chamorro speakers in the CNMI, out of a combined
Chamorro and Carolinian population of 20, 161. 193 Many children aged 13 and below do not speak Chamorro at all. 194 The question then arises, what is the prevailing custom from which customary law should be drawn?
The CNMI Supreme Court in Estate of Rangamar attempted to provide an answer:
We agree that custom over time may gradually change by a uniform and common change in practice. However, such changes are neither legally binding [n] or accepted customs until they have at least existed long enough to have become generally known and have been peaceably and fairly uniformly acquiesced in by those whose rights would naturally be affected. Mere agreement to new ways of doing things by those to be benefitted without the consent of those to be adversely affected, will not of itself work a sudden change of customary law.
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This opinion appears to empower the Court to be the cultural keeper of society, capable of deciding when and if a custom has been around long enough to be enforced upon "those whose rights would naturally be affected." Given the increasing intermarriage between people of Northern Mariana Islands descent and non-natives, 196 as well as the large number of non-natives involved in land transactions or criminal jury trials, those whose rights may be affected now include a diverse array of society.
As stated in Estate of Isaac Kaipat, following customary law may require a shift in the determination of just what constitutes this law. 197 Through its initial efforts to codify law into the 1984 CNMI Code, the Legislature seems to have recognized that certain traditions (such as oral conveyances other than the partida) are unworkable in the modern Northern Marianas. Other traditions can and should be applied. Rather than allowing the judiciary to decide which customs to apply and how to apply them, the CNMI Legislature should revise the statutory code to better address customary law. In the meantime, litigants are subject to an unpredictable application of statutes, customary law according to the most convincing expert witness, common law according to the Restatement, or whatever else the court can extract from U.S. jurisprudence.
